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In the U.S. and in Chile, there have been heated debates about the relative merits of a 
decentralized privatized pension system relative to a more traditional social security system. On 
the firm side, there are concerns that pension funds engage in anticompetitive behavior and take 
advantage of consumers’ by charging high fees and account maintenance changes. On the 
consumer side, there are concerns that consumers do not select wisely among funds and take on 
too much risk. Any pension system with insurance features to protect against low levels of 
pension accumulations is potentially subject to moral hazard problems, in the form of 
consumers’ taking on too much risk. In the case of Chile, the government provides a minimum 
pension benefit to those with low pension accumulations, which can make some consumers more 
willing to take risks. For these reasons, the Chilean government introduced regulations on 
pension fund firms’ investments designed to limit risk. This paper analyzes the determinants of 
consumers’ choices of pension fund and of pension fund characteristics (performance and fees), 
taking into account governmental regulations. In particular, it estimates a demand and supply 
model of the pension fund investment market using a longitudinal household dataset gathered in 
2002 and 2004 in Chile, administrative data on fund choices, and longitudinal data on cost 
determinants of pension funds. We find that the existing regulation actually increases the level of 
risk in the market, reduces heterogeneity across firms, and reduces incentives for consumers to 
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 1 Introduction
The United States and many European countries are currently considering how best
to reform their pay-as-you-go social security systems. Demographic trends indicate
rising numbers of pensioners per worker and pending insolvency of many social secu-
rity systems. The kinds of reforms being considered include increasing the required
social security contribution per worker, raising the standard retirement age, or over-
hauling the system by transiting to a fully funded system. Chile has been at the
forefront of pension reforms, having switched to a fully funded private retirement
accounts system twenty eight years ago.1 Numerous other Latin American countries
followed suit, building on the Chilean model. These include (with years of adoption
in parentheses) Peru (1993), Colombia (1994), Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1996),
Bolivia (1997), Mexico (1997), El Salvador (1998), Costa Rica (2001), the Dominican
Republic (2003), Nicaragua (2004) and Equador (2004).2
Previous research on Chile mainly examined the impact of pension reforms on
the macro-economy, capital markets and aggregate savings.3 It found substantial ben-
eﬁts of moving to a private retirement accounts system in developing well-functioning
capital markets and stimulating economic growth. However, there continues to be a
heated debate about other relative merits of a decentralized, private system. Critics
of privatization point to low coverage rates and commissions and fees that are thought
to be excessive.4 Low coverage rates are mainly due to the presence of an informal
sector of the economy, where workers do not contribute to the system, and to low la-
bor force participation among some groups in the population, such as women.5 With
1University of Chicago economists played a role in the early adoption of the privatized account
system under Pinochet’s military regime.
2Cogan and Mitchell (2003) discuss prospects for funded individual deﬁned contributions acount
pensions in the United States.
3Many have written on Chilean pensions system (e.g. Cheyre, 1988; Iglesias and Acuña, 1991;
Baeza, Margozzini, Arroyo, 1995, and SAFP, 1998). Some of the literature is summarized in Arenas
de Mesa, Bravo, Behrman, Mitchell, and Todd (2006).
4A recent critique citing the problem of low coverage rates is Holzmann, Hinz et. al. (2005).
5See Arenas de Mesa, Bravo, Behrman, Mitchell, and Todd (2006).regard to commissions and fees, it was initially thought that free market entry and
competition among fund administrators (called AFPs) would ensure that fees and
commissions would be kept at minimal levels. However, low rates of ﬁnancial liter-
acy may be a factor inhibiting consumers from selecting wisely among plans, which
could facilitate the survival of higher cost AFPs.6
The proposed plans for pension reform in the US and in Europe have many
features in common with Chile’s current pension plan. They outline a system under
which all workers are mandated to contribute a pre-speciﬁed part of their income to
their pension account, which is managed by money manager(s) (either a government
owned company or competitive industry of money managers). The government serves
as a last resort guarantor, supplementing pension income if pension accumulations
are insuﬃcient upon retirement (below pre-speciﬁed minimal level) either because
of low income or unfavorable returns on investment. All these features are present
in Chilean pension fund system, called the Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones
(AFPs).
Two important concerns have been raised about fully funded pension sys-
tems. The ﬁrst is that government obligations can be large, particularly in years
with unfavorable market returns on investments. Second, the government guaran-
tee of minimal support may induce moral hazard problems by providing incentives
for consumers with low income to choose risky investment options. If the system
is run by a competitive industry then money managers may oﬀer products to meet
this riskier demand, which, in turn, can raise government obligations. This is clearly
undesirable feature of a competitive pension fund industry, although competition can
also bring beneﬁts of more eﬃcient pricing, incentives for costs eﬃciency and quality
improvement.
6Regulations in Chile stipulate that the pension fund regulatory agency supply consumers with
regular quarterly reports that compare the performance and costs of funds, but only about half of
those surveyed in our household survey data report having read their reports. The report is called
the "Cartola."
2Chile has a competitive industry overseeing pension investment that is subject
to government regulations that are designed to promote transparency of fees, to fa-
cilitate switching among funds and to limit the riskiness of the investment products
oﬀered. A particularly important regulation is a return requirement under which
money managers are responsible with their capital for delivering a rate of return no
lower than 2% below industry average.7 This regulation essentially shifts some of
the risk of investment from consumers to the pension fund ﬁrm.
This paper investigates the choice of product and subsequent pricing in the
Chilean pension investment industry, that we model as oligopolistic. More speciﬁcally,
we investigate eﬀectiveness of the Chilean regulation in limiting risk in the system
and compare in to alternative forms of regulation. The question of whether and to
what extent governmental regulations imposed on a privatized account system can
protect investors from risk without too greatly compromising investment returns is
pertinent not only for Chile but also for any other country considering a move to a
privatized account system.
Our analysis combines data from multiple sources: longitudinal household sur-
vey data gathered in 2002 and 2004, administrative data on contributions and fund
choices from 1981-2004 that was obtained from the pension fund regulatory agency,
market data on the performance of the various funds, and a data series on the fees
charged by funds as well as accounting cost data. The household survey data come
from the 2002 Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social (HLLS) survey and the 2004 En-
questa Proteccion Sociale (EPS) follow up survey. The data contain demographic and
labor market information on 17,246 individuals age 15 or older, including information
on household demographics, work history, pension plan participation, and savings, as
7There is also a regulation that requires AFP ﬁrms that have returns in excess of 2% above the
market average to keep the excess in a reserve fund to be used in the event of reaching the lower
return bounday. In practice, the upper limit was only reached once by two ﬁrms (Fomenta and
Valora). In that case, the excess return was paid out to the investors when the ﬁrms merged. In
this paper, we ignore the upper bound on AFP returns, which essentially assumes that consumers
get any excess returns. The upper bound was eliminated in 2008.
3well as more limited information on health, assets, disability status and utilization of
medical services.
Under the Chilean pension system, consumers are required to invest all their
pension accumulations with one money manager. However, they can freely move their
savings from one money manager to another. Additionally, the funds are not allowed
to charge a fee to set up an account or to withdraw money. We develop a model
of consumer choices among AFP funds that assumes that the consumer chooses an
AFP to manage his/her pension savings at the beginning of each period (annually).
The consumer’s choice of investment fund at a given point of time depends on the
product’s characteristics (mean return and risk) and on the fees charged by that fund.
Chilean pension funds charge ﬁxed and variable fees that depend on contribution
levels. A fund with a high ﬁx e df e eb u tal o wv a r i a b l ef e em i g h tb el o w e s tc o s t
for a consumer with a high contribution level, whereas a fund with zero ﬁxed fee
but a high variable fee might be lowest cost for someone with a low contribution
level. Our modeling framework also allows for observable and unobservable sources
of heterogeneity in risk preferences across consumers as well as unobservable attributes
of pension fund ﬁrms that may, in addition to fund performance, aﬀect perceptions
of fund quality. Repeated pension fund choices over time determine the consumer’s
balance accumulation. Aggregation over consumers generates the market demand for
an AFP product. Additionally, we model consumer’s decision of whether to contribute
o rn o ti nag i v e np e r i o da sad e c i s i o no fw h e t h e rt ob ee m p l o y e di naf o r m a lo ri n f o r m a l
sector in a given time period (contribution to the pension system is mandatory for
workers in the formal sector).
The supply side of the market is modeled as an oligopolistic environment in
which AFPs sequentially choose location (mean return and risk) and fees, taking into
account the distribution of consumers’ preferences and consumer types as deﬁned by
consumer characteristics. We rigorously justify our supply side model and the esti-
4mation procedure in a companion paper, Krasnokutskaya, Ressner and Todd (2008)
that also proves existence of equilibrium.
The demand side of the model is a multinomial choice model, which we esti-
mate using the simulated method of moments technique of McFadden(1990). Our
estimation of the demand side parameters recovers the coeﬃcients of the risk aver-
sion which are in line with the estimates found in other studies.We ﬁnd that the risk
aversion is inverse U-shaped with the youngest and oldest being more willing to take
on risk. Our estimates are based on micro-moments evaluating the contribution of
diﬀerent consumer characteristics to the consumer’s propensity to make a speciﬁc
choice predicted consumer choices. We examine the goodness of ﬁt of the model
both to the moments used in estimation and with respect to aggregate statistics on
market balance shares that were not used in the estimation and ﬁnd that the model
has a reasonably good ﬁt. Lastly, we estimate the supply side of the model using
standard panel data techniques. The translog cost function estimates point to the
existence of an optimal scale both with respect to the number of consumers and total
balance managed by the AFP fund. We do not ﬁnd evidence of increasing returns to
scale throughout, supporting the role for more than one ﬁrm in supplying the pension
fund market.
After estimating the parameters of the demand and supply model, i.e. the
distribution of consumers’ tastes and companies’ cost functions, we use the model
to conduct counterfactual experiments that study ﬁrm and consumer behavior un-
der alternative regulatory schemes. For example, instead of requiring AFP ﬁrms to
deliver returns close to the industry average, an alternative regulation would explic-
itly regulate the choice of investment instruments. We evaluate the eﬀectiveness of
alternative designs of the pension system and compare them to the current regula-
tory environment using average life-time pension accumulation of individuals as a
criterion for choosing among regulatory schemes. We ﬁnd that the current Chilean
5regulatory rule creates incentives for AFPs to invest in riskier portfolios than they
would otherwise choose were the riskiness of the portfolio explicitly regulated. It also
leads to relatively lower levels of participation in the pension plan. Also, the choice
of the portfolios under the current regulation is riskier than selection of portfolios the
social planner would choose. Not surprisingly, it leads to a higher than desirable (by
a social planner) volatility in accumulated balances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides some background
information on the Chilean private accounts system. Section three describes the
consumer’s choice problem and bieﬂy outlines the oligopolistic model of ﬁrm price
and location decisions. Section four describes the estimation strategy. Section ﬁve
presents the empirical results and section six concludes.
2 Industry Description and Related Literature
2.1 Industry Description
As previously described, investors in the Chilean pension system are permitted to hold
their money in only one AFP at a time. The rules governing switching between money
managers changed several time over the years, but beginning in 1984 investors could
switch funds without incurring any monetary costs. Pension funds charge fees for their
services. Initially, the fee was a three part non-linear tariﬀ consisting of a ﬁxed fee,
a variable fee proportional to the participant’s contribution, and a fee proportional
to participant’s balance. Some companies also charged fees for withdrawal of funds,
but in 1984 the government passed a regulation to disallow fees on the balance or on
withdrawal. Currently, most AFPs charge a two-part tariﬀ consisting of a ﬁxed fee
and a fee that is proportional to participant’s contribution.
From the inception of the private accounts system, the government exerted
control over the investment choices. Initially, pension investments could only be
6held in government bonds, but over time the options expanded to include riskier
assets, namely stocks and a higher degree of foreign investments. As an additional
measure to reduce risk in the system, the government required that AFPs deliver a real
return within 2 percentage points from the industry average, making the AFP ﬁrms
responsible for covering low realizations of returns with their own capital. During
the period after 1987, a number of AFPs had ﬁnancial diﬃculties because of these
restrictions and had to exit the market.8
Up until 2000, each AFP ﬁrm essentially oﬀered a single investment product.
Starting in 2000, however, they were allowed to oﬀer four instruments which diﬀer
according to the riskiness of the investment.9 In the analysis here, we use data
f r o mt h et i m ep e r i o dp r i o rt oo ﬀering multiple investment instruments to simplify the
modeling of the ﬁrm’s choice of their product characteristics.
2.2 Related literature
There exists a substantial literature based on US data that studies to what extent
performance of mutual fund managers, stock analysts etc. can be predicted from pub-
licly available data on their characteristics and past performance. However, we are
aware of only one study by Hortacsu and Syverson (2003) that focused on consumer
choice among money managing companies; it explores consumer choices of S&P 500
index funds, which exhibit return homogeneity and sizeable dispersion in fund fees.
They ﬁnd that consumer choices are largely driven by search costs, i.e. the cost of
acquiring information about a fund which would be indicative of the fund’s future
performance. The authors conclude that this property combined with consumer het-
erogeneity in search costs and large proportion of consumers with high costs leads
8In each case, the exit was organized as a merger with one of the existing AFPs. The clients
of an exiting AFP were transferred to its merging partner, though they could easily switch funds
afterwards.
9Each of these instruments has a targeted age group. An investor’s contributions are allocated
by default into an age-appropriate fund unless he/she chooses otherwise.
7to a large dispersion in funds fees. The literature on consumer choice of services/
products in the presence of switching costs emphasizes entry barriers that arise as
a result of switching costs, low incentives to invest in quality and adverse selection
which arises if the switching cost is private information of the consumer. Some of the
empirical and theoretical papers in this area include Beggs and Klemperer (1992),
Calem, Gordy and Mester (2005), Gravelle and Masiero (2000), Kiser (2002), Klem-
perer (1987), Knittel (1997), Rhoades (2000), Stango (2002).
3M o d e l
This section describes the demand side model of consumer’s choice of AFP fund and
the supply side model of AFP funds pricing and location decisions in an oligopolistic
environment. The supply side model is exposited in greater detail in a companion
paper, Krasnokutskaya, Ressner and Todd (2008), which also proves existence of
equilibrium.
3.1 Demand side model of consumer’s choice of AFP
Under the Chilean private accounts system, consumers can freely switch AFP funds
without incurring monetary switching costs. We, therefore, model the consumer’s
problem as a choice of fund in a given time period corresponding to a year.
Ac o n s u m e ri in period t is characterized by the tuple (bit,y it,γit,  it) ∈ Bt
where Bt is a convex subset of R3+J, J is the total number of funds available, bit ≥ 0
is the pension balance of consumer i at time t, yit ≥ 0 is the size of his pension
contribution in period tγ it ≥ 0 reﬂects consumer i’s attitude towards risk, and
 it={ ijt} represent the unobservable part of consumer preferences for pension funds.
The risk attitude parameter is assumed to depend on demographic characteristics,
which is why we allow it to vary with t. In the following, we refer to a consumer
8characterized by (bit,y it,γit,  it)) ∈ Bt as consumer i.
A consumer considers fund j as being characterized by its return, Rjt, fees,
and other non-pecuniary features related to the convenience of obtaining service from
this fund. The consumer regards Rjt as a random variable. We assume that con-
sumer knows the portfolio compositions of all AFPs and, therefore, the joint and
marginal distributions of AFP returns. Moreover, if the government requires the
AFP to to guarantee annual return withing 2 percentage points of industry average,
then consumers will incorporate this guaranteed return into their decision making.
Speciﬁcally, a consumer recognizes that if he deposites his money with fund j, his
actual return would be e Rjt = max(Rjt,
P
(Rlt)/J − 0.02). Finally, we assume that
consumer utility in a given time period is quadratic in retirement wealth and additive
in other non-pecuniary costs. The fees associated with participating in various funds
diﬀer by consumers, because they depend on contribution levels.
The preferences of consumer i from choosing fund j in period t are given by:




+ ξj +  ijt, (1)
where wijt =( bit + yit − pijt) denotes the net retirement wealth (balance plus new
contributions minus fees) of consumer i given his choice of company j at time t,a n d
s(wijt)=w
−α
ijt ,withα>1.10.T h e v a r i a b l e ξj represents the unobserved product-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect. Thus, the expected utility of consumer i is given by:




2)+ξj +  ijt. (2)
Consumers choose to invest their retirement savings at the company which
oﬀers the highest contemporaneous utility. Let Mjt ⊂ B ⊂ R3,w h e r e
Mjt(pjt,p−jt,R jt,R−jt) ≡
(
(bit,y it,γit,  ijt): Euijt ≥ Euikt for k 6= j| (pjt,p−jt,x jt,x−jt)
)
(3)
10Pedersen and Satchell (2003) show that this modiﬁcation of the quadratic utility function re-
moves its implausible IARA and bliss point property
9denote the set of consumers that prefer AFP j over its competitors −j. The demand




dG(bt,y t,γt,  t), (4)
where G(·) denotes the joint cdf of consumer’s risk attitude, balance, contribution, and
unobservable tastes. We assume that the joint distribution of consumer characteristics
satisﬁes the following condition:
Condition 1: [Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991)]: In a given period the joint
probability density of consumers’ unobserved preferences, risk attitude, balance, and
contribution , g(b,y,γ, ) is such that g(b,y,γ, )
− 1
4+J,i sac o n c a v ef u n c t i o no v e r
its support B, which is a convex subset of R3+J with positive volume. In addition
RW0 =s u p {b,y,γ, }∈B RW is ﬁnite.
This condition is require for existence of equilibrium, as shown n Krasnokutskaya,
Ressner and Todd (2008).
3.2 The Decision to Participate in the Pension System
Low participation rates is a key concern raised by critics of the Chilean pension
system. As in many other Latin American countries, Chile has an informal sector
of the economy comprised of workers without a wage contract, i.e. those who are
self-employed or are paid on per-hour basis. The contributions to pension system
are mandatory for formal sector workers but are voluntary for the part-time workers
and the informal sector workers. Only a very small fraction of people for whom
contributions are voluntary choose to contribute to pension system. However, some
of these workers will still be participating in the pension system, because of previously
held formal sector jobs for which they have some pension accumulations. Because the
fraction of people participating is an important factor determining ﬁrm’s proﬁts as
well as the level of government obligations, we modify our model to take into account
10t h ec h o i c eo fw h e t h e rt op a r t i c i p a t e .
We assume that participation/contribution decisions are made an annual basis.
Each year an individual decides whether to work in the formal or informal sector
and to which fund he/she should allocate the current pension balance. Consider an
individual characterized by (bit,Y i0t,Y i1t,γit,τit,  it) where τit is individual i0sr a t eo f
substitution between consumption today and consumption at the time of retirement;
Yi0t and Yi1t indicate yearly incomes that an individual can earn in the informal and
formal sector. The set of possible choices includes {(j,0),(j,1)} for every j =1 ,..,J
where (j,0) corresponds to working in the informal sector and (j,1) corresponds to
working in the formal sector. The utility individual derives form a choice (j,k) is




+ τit(Yi0t − 0.9Yi1t)+ξj +  i(j,0)t




+ ξj +  i(j,1)t, (5)
where wi(j,k)t =( bit +0.1Yi1t −pi(j,k)t). If an individual never contributed before and
does not contribute in period t, his/her utility is
Ui(0,0)t = α0 + τit(Yi0t − 0.9Yi1t)+ i(0,0)t (6)
The rest of the demand analysis proceeds as before, with consumers who choose
to participate in the system making a choice of pension fund. Consumer fund choice
decisions deﬁne the set of clients served by each AFP as well the total amount of
funds managed by a particular AFP in a year t.
3.3 Supply side
The supply side of the market is based on a modeling framework developed in a com-
panion paper, Krasnokutskaya, Ressner and Todd (2008). The supply side market
is made up of J pension funds (we do not model the ﬁrm entry decision). The
11demand model assumed that consumers have quadratic utility with respect to re-
tirement wealth. In this context, application of the mutual fund separation theorem
would imply that money managers — the AFPs — will choose a convex combination
of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio. The fund’s portfolio can therefore be
summarized by the share that the fund invests in the market portfolio (or equivalently
by the correlation between the market excess return and funds excess return). We
refer to this share as fund’s choice of "location" and denote it by xjt.
In the Chilean pension market, the regulatory agency does not allow AFPs to
charge fees on balances or on withdrawal of funds. Therefore, we restrict our attention
to the two part-tariﬀ fee structure of the type:
pijt = pj0t + pj1tyit, (7)
where pj0t denotes company j’s ﬁxed fee and pj1t is company j’s percentage fee on
consumer i’s pension contribution in period t, yit.
To describe the decision problem of the AFP ﬁrm, we ﬁrst formulate a model
for the production process that the AFP uses to provide its services. We think of
the ﬁnal of output of an AFP as being two-dimensional. It consists of the number
of customers that receive services as well as the total balance that the AFP manages
for them. We assume that all AFP’s have access to the same technology, which may
have economies of scale related to both inputs as well as the relative level of inputs.
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a tA F P sm a yh a v eﬁrm-speciﬁcc o s tf a c t o r sw h i c hr e ﬂect
managerial talent or any other ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity factor. Denote by TB jt the




(bit + yit − pijt)dG(,b t,y t,γt,  t); (8)




yitdG(,b t,y t,γt,  t); (9)
12The cost function of the fund j is given by a translog function C(Djt,TB jt) such that




where νj are ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Additionally, Chile’s regulation concerning a minimum
rate of return that the funds have to provide imposes an additional cost on the AFP
which, in expectation, is equal to
C
reg
jt = E[(Rjt − Rt +0 .02)|Rjt <R t − 0.002]TB jt, (11)
where Rt denotes average return across all AFPs.11
The expected proﬁto fA F Pj that chooses the location xjt and charges pjt =
(p0jt,p 1jt) is given by
E[Πjt(pjt,p−jt,x jt,x−jt)] = p0jtDjt + p1jtTYjt − C(Djt,TB jt) − C
reg
jt
in the unregulated system if its competitors locate at x−jt and charge p−jt.T h el a s t
term is only present under the regulation.
3.3.1 Equilibrium conditions of the location-then-price game
At a given point in time, competition between AFPs takes the form of a two-stage
game. In the ﬁrst stage, the AFP ﬁrms simultaneously and irrevocably choose their
locations. In the second stage, each AFP observes the choices of the other ﬁrms
and selects a price that is contingent on the chosen locations. Thereafter, the rate of
return on the market portfolio is realized, interest is paid on consumers’ net retirement
wealth, and AFPs’ proﬁts accrue. We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium by
backward induction, as described in Krasnokutskaya, Ressner and Todd (2008).
11As previously noted, funds have to cover realizations of returns that are more than 2% below
the industry average with their own capital.
134 Estimation Methodology
This section ﬁrst describes how we estimate the parameters of consumer preferences
and of the industry cost structure from the data. Then it describes how we character-
ize and estimate ﬁrms’ location decisions. In particular, we assume that the fund’s
location is summarized by its CAPM beta, which we estimate using historical data
on returns.
4.1 Consumer Preferences
A consumer chooses one fund out of multiple discrete alternatives. As noted in the
previous section, his/her preference for alternative funds is described by a random
utility model, where utility depends on balances, current contribution level, fees, and
the location of the ﬁrm. Consumers diﬀer in their risk aversion in a way that depends
on observable demographics as well as on unobservables (random coeﬃcients). The
demand model also allows includes alternative-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to accomodate
unobserved diﬀerences in the perception of fund quality.
The demand model is estimated using McFadden’s (1989) simulated method
of moments (SMM) approach. The parameter vector θ is recovered as
θ = argminθ(d − P(θ)
0W
0W(d − P(θ)) (12)
Here d denotes Jn× 1 vector of consumer choices with dij =1if individual i chose
alternative j and P(θ) represents the predicted choice given a vector of coeﬃcients θ.
Therefore, d−P(θ) is a vector of residuals stacked by individual and by alternatives
for a given individual. The matrix W is K ×Jn array of instruments of rank K ≥ k
where k is the length of parameter vector.
The choice probability is estimated using a frequency simulator. McFad-
den(1989) shows that with a suitable choice of a simulator and matrix of instruments
proportional to ∂ln(P(θ
∗)/∂θ, the method is asymptotically eﬃcient. We implement
14the method using an iterative process. First, we ﬁnd an ‘initial consistent’ estimator
of θ
∗ using a matrix of non-optimal instruments (Xkij,X2
kij).T h e nw eu s et h eﬁrst-
stage estimator to construct nearly optimal instruments which are used to obtain ﬁnal
estimate of θ
∗. As required by the method, we use two independent sets of random
draws in estimation: the ﬁrst set to construct the instruments and the second set to
simulate choice probabilities.














G =l i m
n→∞n












Here r is the number of draws used in the frequency simulator.
4.2 The Cost Function
The parameters of the cost function are estimated using annual data on various
components of ﬁrms’ operational costs. This estimation is informative on potential
scale eﬀects both with respect to the number of customers served and the total balance
managed by a particular fund, while allowing for the interdependence of these two
factors in determining costs. We also allow costs to depend on the riskiness of the
product the fund oﬀers. To this end, we estimate the cost function using a ﬂexible
‘translog’ functional form, where costs depend on the number of customers (Njt), the
total balance managed (Bjt) and the fund’s location (xjt). Speciﬁcally, we assume
15that




+νj + γ10D1981 + ... + γ28D1999 +  jt
where νj are ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and Dy are year eﬀects. The parameters are estimated
using standard panel data methods.
4.3 Recovering Fund’s Locations
The pension funds’ choice of location or riskiness of fund’s portfolio is an important
component of both the demand and supply side models. However, this variable is not
directly observable in the data and therefore needs to be inferred from information on
the fund’s history of returns. In implementing the model, we use the fund’s CAPM
beta to represent its location choice. More speciﬁcally, we work with a model of
time varying beta and GARCH errors to recover funds’ betas for use in cost function
estimation. We also use this model to approximate consumer’s forecast of the funds’
expected returns and return volatilities. Our approach is based on Bollerslev at al.’s
(1989) CAPM model with time varying covariances. Denote by Yj,t an excess return
of fund j at time t and by Ym,t an excess market return at time t. We assume that
vector (Yj,t,Y m,t) changes over time according to
Yj,t = bj + δhjm,t +  jt (18)
Ym,t = bm +  mt
Additionally, t =(  jt,  mt) is distributed according to N(0,H t) with
hjj,t = γjj + αjj 
2
j,t−1 + βjjhjj,t−1 (19)
hmm,t = γmm + αmm 
2
m,t−1 + βmmhmm,t−1
hjm,t = γjm + αjm j,t−1 m,t−1 + βjmhjm,t−1
16Model parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood. The beta values and fore-
casts are obtained using rolling 18 months window.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics derived from the administrative pension
data, which includes men and women. The pension plan participants a m p l ei sf a i r l y
young, with a median age of 34 and an interquartile range of 27-42. The median years
of contribution is 3.83 years with an interquartile range of 1.41-7.58. The median
balance is close to the median of one year’s annual income.There is rising dispersion
with age, particularly over the age 35-45 range. At subsequent ages, the dispersion
remains roughly constant. There is also increasing dispersion in income up through
age 40, as exhibited by the interquartile range, after which it declines. The dispersion
in income is not as large as the dispersion in balances, which might be expected given
that balances represent a stock measure and income a ﬂow measure.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
25% centile median 75% centile
age 27 34 42
annual income (all) $ 20 1342 3196
annual income (age=30) $ 0 1250 2916
annual income (age=40) $ 10 1512 3705
annual income (age=55) $ 100 834 3235
balance (all) $ 283 1090 3381
balance (age=30) $ 190 930 2231
balance (age=40) $ 500 2500 6210
balance (age=55) $ 653 2670 7161
years contributing 1.41 3.83 7.58
17We next turn to descriptive characteristics of the AFP ﬁrms. Table 2 shows the
ﬁxed and variable fees charged by the AFP ﬁrms in year 1999 and reveals substantial
variation in the fees charged across ﬁrms. A number of funds do not charge any
ﬁxed fee. The AFP ﬁrm Habitat has the lowest variable fee at 2.84% of monthly
contributions and no ﬁxed fee. The ﬁrm Concordia has the highest ﬁxed fee at 3.48%
and also a relatively high ﬁxed fee at 230 pesos per month.
Table 2: Fees Charged by AFP Firms













I nT a b l e3 ,w ec o m p a r et h em a r k e ts h a r e so ft h ed i ﬀerent funds in terms of the
share of clients and the share of the total market balance under each ﬁrm’s manage-
ment. The table also shows the estimated CAPM-beta, with lower betas indicating
lower risk. The fund with the largest market share both in terms of customers and
balances is Provida, which manages pensions for about one-third of all pension plan
participants. Provida is also one of the least risky funds. The AFP ﬁrm Santa Maria
has the second largest market share in terms of clients but ranks lower in terms of
balance shares. Its portfolio allocation is in the median risk range. The ﬁrm with
the lowest fees, Habitat, is relatively low ranking in terms of numbers of share of
customers but is in the top three in terms of share of total balances. There are also
a number of funds in the market with very low shares of customers and of balances.
For example, Fomenta has the riskiest portfolio, measured in terms of the beta, and
18also attracts few clients. In summary, there is substantial heterogeneity across ﬁrms
in fee structures, in shares of clients and in shares of balances.
Table 3: Market Structure
N_Share B_Share Beta
Concordia 0.191 0.223 35.6
Cuprum 0.018 0.005 54.0
Habitat 0.058 0.133 40.0
Planvital 0.027 0.011 52.5
Provida 0.345 0.450 37.6
Santa Maria 0.207 0.074 33.0
Summa 0.076 0.053 50.0
Magister 0.014 0.008 53.0
Union 0.051 0.024 52.0
Proteccion 0.013 0.013 55.0
Futuro 0.000 0.001 38.0
Fomenta 0.001 0.005 64.0
5.2 Model Estimates
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present estimated model parameters and evidence on goodness
of ﬁt. As described above, we allow risk aversion (the γ parameter) to depend
on demographics and also allow for a random coeﬃcient component to risk aversion
to reﬂect unobservable sources of heterogeneity in people’s attitudes towards risk.
Theoretical models of dynamic savings accumulation decisions would suggest that
age is an important characteristic in determining risk aversion, although its net eﬀect
on risk aversion is ambiguous. Older individuals are typically less willing to take on
investment risk, because of a shorter time horizon until retirement, but may also be
more willing to take on risk, because they have higher balances.
19Table 4: Demand Estimation: Risk Aversion
Parameter Std. Error
mean
age ≥ 35 -3.36 1.23
35 ≤ age≤ 50 -7.34 1.34
age ≥ 50 -5.36 1.51
sigma 2.05 0.95
Table 5 presents estimates of absolute and of relative risk aversion at diﬀerent
ages. The Arrow (1965)-Pratt (1964) measure of absolute risk aversion (as a function









These are standard measures of risk aversion that stay constant up to aﬃne trans-
formations of the utility function.12 As seen in the table, people are estimated to be
more risk averse at age 40 than at age 30 or 50.
Table 5: Implied Risk Aversion





In Table 6, we examine the importance of unobservables to the ﬁto ft h em o d e l .
Speciﬁcally, we evaluate the ﬁt of the moments under the original model and under
12The advantage of the relative measure vis-a-vis the absolute measure is that it accomodates the
situation varying degrees of risk aversion at diﬀerent levels of c (for example, switching from being
risk averse to risk loving and then back to risk averse).
20two restricted version of the model, one that sets the alternative-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
to zero (i.e. shuts down permanent unobservable ﬁrm heterogeneity) and one that,
in addition, suppresses the utility shock. We ﬁnd that the ﬁt of the moments is
not greatly compromized by shutting down unobservable sources of heterogeneity,
although the ﬁt is certainly improved by including these components.
T a b l e6 :R o l eo fU n o b s e r v a b l e s
Proportion explained
Observable part of utility function 75%
Observable part plus ﬁxed eﬀects 80%
Observable part plus ﬁxed eﬀects plus Weibull errors 97%
Table 7 compares the model’s aggregate predicted shares of annual contribu-
tions to pension funds to the empirical shares. Recall that in estimation we only used
moments pertaining to shares of customers and share of balances. The moments
related to shares of contributions were not used in estimating the model parameters,
so this comparison could be viewed as a form of model validation. Generally, the
model is able to identify the top ﬁve AFP ﬁrms in terms of shares of contributions
and is fairly accurate in terms of predicting the actual contribution share for four of
the ﬁve funds. The AFP ﬁrm Provida had the largest contribution share in the data,
which is also predicted by the model. For the third (Concordia), though, the model
overpredicts the contribution share.













Table 8 provides AFP cost function estimates that are derived from panel
data on ﬁrms, costs and cost components. We assume that the cost depends on the
number of clients served, the total balance under management, and the ﬁrm’s location
choice. We specify the cost function ﬂexibly as a function of linear and interaction
eﬀects in these variables. According to the estimates, once the pension fund reaches
a certain size there are decreasing returns to scale. This implies that the market is
eﬃciently served by more than one pension fund ﬁrm.







log(affiliates) ∗ log(assets) -0.086 0.27
226 Policy Experiments
When the Chilean pension system was designed, the government sought to limit down-
side market risk by placing restrictions on AFP investment behavior. As previously
noted, current regulations require that AFPs guarantee a market return that is within
2% of the industry average. We next use our estimated demand and supply-side
model to evaluate the eﬀects of this regulatory restriction on AFP location choices,
on individual pension performance and balance accumulations, and on participation
rates in the pension fund program. For reasons of computational diﬃculty, our simu-
lations are based on a market with three ﬁr m so n l y( t h el a r g e s tﬁrms in the market).
In future work, we plan to extend the analysis to include more ﬁrms.
Our simulation compares the AFP location decisions and individual pension
fund investment decisions under the current regulatory environment to those that
would be realized (i) under a social planner and (ii) under an alternative form of
regulation that would place an upper limit on the riskiness of the ﬁrm’s portfolio (the
CAPM beta).
T a b l e9s h o w st h ea v e r a g el o c a t i o nd e c i s i o n so fﬁrms under the three diﬀer-
ent scenarios (the social planner, the restriction on riskiness of the portfolio and the
restriction on returns (the current regulation)). Interestingly, the current regula-
tion that requires that returns not fall too far below the industry average leads to
substantially riskier ﬁrm location decisions.
Table 9: Policy Experiments: Locations
Mean Std. Dev.
Social Planner 0.36 0.12
Restriction on Portfolio 0.33 0.15
Restriction on returns 0.45 0.05
Table 10 compares the expected coverage rates of the pension system under the
23three diﬀerent cases. As previously noted, a major concern of the Chilean government
today is low coverage rates, with a substantial fraction of workers opting to work
outside the formal sector of the economy and therefore to not participate in the
pension program. The estimates in Table 10 show that the coverage under the
current regulation is about 60%, which is signiﬁcantly lower than it would be under a
social planner or under the alternative regulation that restricts portfolio risk directly.
The lower coverage arises because some individuals opt not to participate in the higher
risk environment.
Table 10: Policy Experiment: Consumers
Coverage Mean Std. Dev.
(Balance) (Balance)
Social Planner 72% 35mil 13mil
Restriction on Portfolio 75% 30mil 10mil
Restriction on returns 60% 39mil 21mil
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Chile has one of the oldest individual-account pension systems and therefore provides
a unique opportunity to study ﬁrm and consumer behavior under a well established
private accounts system. The design of the Chilean pension system includes insur-
ance features, in the form of a minimum return guarantee and a minimum pension
guarantee, that are intended to protect investors against low levels of pension accu-
mulations. These guarantees create the potential for moral hazard in consumers’
investment decisions.
In this paper, we developed a demand and supply model of the Chilean pen-
sion fund market. In the demand model, a consumer chooses an AFP to manage
his/her investments, taking into account pension fund fees and historical pension
fund performance. Consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their demographics and
24in risk aversion. The supply side is modeled as an oligopolistic environment in which
AFPs sequentially choose product location (mean and variance of the return), and the
ﬁxed and variable fees they charge for service while taking into account consumers’
preferences for risk.
After estimating the parametes of the model, we use the model to assess the
impact of government regulations on pension funds’ choices of locations. We also
study implications of regulations for the consumers’ accumulated balances and for
volatility in balances. We ﬁnd that Chilean regulatory rule that mandates ﬁrms to
guarantee returns within 2% of the industry average creates incentives for the AFP
ﬁrms to invest in the riskier portfolios than they would choose under an alternative
regulation that instead restricts the riskiness of their portfolio limited. Surely, this is
an unanticipated eﬀect of the regulation. Because the portfolio location choices that
ﬁrms make are riskier, fewer people participate in the pension program, which is a
particularly worrisome ﬁnding considering that the government places a high priority
on increasing coverage rates. Also, the choice of the portfolios under the current
regulation is riskier than would be the selection of portfolios that a social planner
would choose. Not surprisingly, it leads to a higher than desirable (by social planner)
volatility in accumulated balances. We ﬁnd that from the point of view of social
welfare, an alternative regulation that restricted directly the investment instruments
of the pension fund rather than requiring them to achieve a performance near the
mean would be more eﬀective.
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